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By NASA
1 min read
Preparations for Next Moonwalk Simulations Underway (and Underwater)
The Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) enables safe, sustainable, and efficient aviation transportation operations to benefit the flying public and ensure the global competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry. We are transforming the future of aviation into a digital, federated, and service-oriented architecture that fosters the growth of safe airspace for all users.
By partnering with FAA, academia, safety experts, operators, manufacturers, municipalities, and other government agencies, we facilitate the integration of new aviation technologies, ensure airspace access for new entrants, and champion the success of increasingly autonomous operations. At AOSP, safety is at the heart of everything we do. We stand firm in our unwavering commitment to the safe integration of these vehicles.
AOSP Approach:
Efficient, Sustainable Aviation Operations Seamless Integration of Heterogeneous and Emergent Aviation Prognostic In-Time Aviation Safety Management System of Future Operations System Level Autonomy for Aviation Operations, Vehicle Command and Control Systems, and Safety Meet the diversity, density, and complexity challenges of future aviation AOSP Projects
Advanced Capabilities for Emergency Response Operations Project
Air Mobility Pathfinders
Air Traffic Management—Exploration (ATM-X)
System-Wide Safety (SWS)
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Last Updated Dec 17, 2024 EditorLillian GipsonContactJim Bankejim.banke@nasa.gov Related Terms
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By NASA
This article is from the 2024 Technical Update.
Multiple human spaceflight programs are underway at NASA including Orion, Space Launch System, Gateway, Human Landing System, and EVA and Lunar Surface Mobility programs. Achieving success in these programs requires NASA to collaborate with a variety of commercial partners, including both new spaceflight companies and robotic spaceflight companies pursuing crewed spaceflight for the first time. It is not always clear to these organizations how to show their systems are safe for human spaceflight. This is particularly true for avionics systems, which are responsible for performing some of a crewed spacecraft’s most critical functions. NASA recently published guidance describing how to show the design of an avionic system meets safety requirements for crewed missions.
Background
The avionics in a crewed spacecraft perform many safety critical functions, including controlling the position and attitude of the spacecraft, activating onboard abort systems, and firing pyrotechnics. The incorrect operation of any of these functions can be catastrophic, causing loss of the crew. NASA’s human rating requirements describe the need for “additional rigor and scrutiny” when designing safety-critical systems beyond that done
for uncrewed spacecraft [2]. Unfortunately, it is not always clear how to interpret this guidance and show an avionics architecture is sufficiently safe. To address this problem, NASA recently published NASA/TM−20240009366 [1]. It outlines best practices for designing safety-critical avionics, as well as describes key artifacts or evidence NASA needs to assess the safety of an avionics architecture.
Failure Hypothesis
One of the most important steps to designing an avionics architecture for crewed spacecraft is specification of the failure hypothesis (FH). In short, the FH summarizes any assumptions the designers make about the type, number, and persistence of component failures (e.g., of onboard computers, network switches). It divides the space of all possible failures into two parts – failures the system is designed to tolerate and failures it is not.
One key part of the FH is a description of failure modes the system can tolerate – i.e., the behavior exhibited by a failed component. Failure modes are categorized using a failure model. A typical failure model for avionics splits failures into two broad categories:
Value failures, where data produced by a component is missing (i.e., an omissive failure) or incorrect (i.e., a transmissive failure). Timing failures, where data is produced by a component at the wrong time.
Timing failures can be further divided into many sub-categories, including:
Inadvertent activation, where data is produced by a component without the necessary preconditions. Out-of-order failures, where data is produced by a component in an incorrect sequence. Marginal timing failures, where data is produced by a component slightly too early or late.
In addition to occurring when data is produced by a component, these failure modes can also occur when data enters a component. (e.g., a faulty component can corrupt a message it receives). Moreover, all failure modes can manifest in one of two ways:
Symmetrically, where all observers see the same faulty behavior. Asymmetrically, where some observers see different faulty behavior.
Importantly, NASA’s human-rating process requires that each of these failure modes be mitigated if it can result in catastrophic effects [2]. Any exceptions must be explicitly documented and strongly justified. In addition to specifying the failure modes a system can tolerate, the FH must specify any limiting assumptions about the relative arrival times of permanent failures and radiation-induced upsets/ errors or the ability for ground operator to intervene to safe the system or take recovery actions. For more information on specifying a FH and other artifacts needed to evaluate the safety of an avionics architecture for human spaceflight, see the full report [1].
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By NASA
NASA has awarded Bastion Technologies Inc., of Houston, the Center Occupational Safety, Health, Medical, System Safety and Mission Assurance Contract (COSMC) at the agency’s Ames Research Center in California’s Silicon Valley.
The COSMC contract is a hybrid cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract, with an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity component and maximum potential value of $53 million. The contract phase-in begins Thursday, Jan. 2, 2025, followed by a one-year base period that begins Feb. 14, 2025, and options to extend performance through Aug. 13, 2030.
Under this contract, the company will provide support for occupational safety, industrial hygiene, health physics, safety and health training, emergency response, safety culture, medical, wellness, fitness, and employee assistance. The contractor also will provide subject matter expertise in several areas including system safety, software safety and assurance, quality assurance, pressure system safety, procurement quality assurance, and range safety. Work will primarily be performed at NASA Ames and NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center in Edwards, California, as needed.
For information about NASA and agency programs, visit:
https://www.nasa.gov
-end-
Tiernan Doyle
NASA Headquarters, Washington
202-358-1600
tiernan.p.doyle@nasa.gov
Rachel Hoover
Ames Research Center, Silicon Valley, Calif.
650-604-4789
rachel.hoover@nasa.gov
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By European Space Agency
Video: 00:02:18 At ESA, through the Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems programme, we’re addressing solutions for when safety and security of communication services cannot be guaranteed by the terrestrial networks alone. With our programme Space systems for Safety and Security, or 4S, we are pioneering cutting-edge development of secure and resilient satellite communication systems, technologies and services to improve life on Earth.
Picture a world where our critical infrastructure is protected from cyber threats, and where communication links work when the world around them doesn't. A transportation network where safety is not just a priority, but a guarantee. Where air traffic flows completely efficiently, reliable and connected. Railways operate without interruption, and shipping can navigate safely and securely.
Imagine that our first responders are coordinating via seamless communications, and institutional agencies are acting rapidly and decisively when there's a crisis. All thanks to secure and safe satellite communication systems, orbiting above the planet. This is the future we're building with the 4S programme. A future where space systems safeguard our security, making sure that connectivity remains our greatest strength. Join us as we continue to push the boundaries of innovation.
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By NASA
In the unforgiving lunar environment, the possibility of an astronaut crewmember becoming incapacitated due to unforeseen circumstances (injury, medical emergency, or a mission-related accident) is a critical concern, starting with the upcoming Artemis III mission, where two astronaut crewmembers will explore the Lunar South Pole. The Moon’s surface is littered with rocks ranging from 0.15 to 20 meters in diameter and craters spanning 1 to 30 meters wide, making navigation challenging even under optimal conditions. The low gravity, unique lighting conditions, extreme temperatures, and availability of only one person to perform the rescue, further complicate any rescue efforts. Among the critical concerns is the safety of astronauts during Extravehicular Activities (EVAs). If an astronaut crewmember becomes incapacitated during a mission, the ability to return them safely and promptly to the human landing system is essential. A single crew member should be able to transport an incapacitated crew member distances up to 2 km and a slope of up to 20 degrees on the lunar terrain without the assistance of a lunar rover. This pressing issue opens the door for innovative solutions. We are looking for a cutting-edge design that is low in mass and easy to deploy, enabling one astronaut crewmember to safely transport their suited (343 kg (~755lb)) and fully incapacitated partner back to the human landing system. The solution must perform effectively in the Moon’s extreme South Pole environment and operate independently of a lunar rover. Your creativity and expertise could bridge this critical gap, enhancing the safety measures for future lunar explorers. By addressing this challenge, you have the opportunity to contribute to the next “giant leap” in human space exploration.
Award: $45,000 in total prizes
Open Date: November 14, 2024
Close Date: January 23, 2025
For more information, visit: https://www.herox.com/NASASouthPoleSafety
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