Jump to content

Recommended Posts

  • Publishers
Posted

2 min read

Preparations for Next Moonwalk Simulations Underway (and Underwater)

Artist concept showing various projects the SWS team works on, from developing new data solutions, new technology and the safety risks associated with it, from robotics to unmanned aircraft and more.

A new era of aviation is here, and NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is developing innovative data solutions to assure safe, rapid, and repeatable access to a transformed National Airspace System (NAS). SWS was created in 2018 and is part of NASA Aeronautics’ Airspace Operations and Safety Program. SWS evaluates how the aerospace industry and aircraft modernization impacts safety by using technology to address future operational and design risks.  

SWS Goals

  1. To explore, discover, and understand the impact on safety of growing complexity introduced by modernization aimed at improving the efficiency of flight, the access to airspace, and the expansion of services provided by air vehicles 
  1. To develop and demonstrate innovative solutions that enable this modernization and the aviation transformation envisioned for global airspace system through proactive mitigation of risks in accordance with target levels of safety 

To transform the NAS, SWS employs high-risk research and development to understand how the modernization of industry and aircraft can affect overall safety. SWS is developing and demonstrating innovative solutions within several key research areas, referred to as technical challenges. 

Current Technical Challenges (TCs)

  • TC-2: In-Flight Safety Predictions for Emerging Operations  
  • TC-4: Complex Autonomous Systems Assurance 
  • TC-5: Safety Demonstrator Series for Operational In-Time Aviation Safety Management System 
  • TC-6: In-Time Aviation Safety Management System 

SWS is developing the concept and requirements for an assured In-Time Aviation Safety Management System to achieve the goals described above. It is an integrated set of services, functions, and capabilities to address operational risks and hazards of a transformed NAS. SWS catalyzes the discovery of the unknown and paves the path forward for aviation safety in the future airspace.

 

Back to main System-Wide Safety project page.

Keep Exploring

Discover More Topics From NASA

Share

Details

Last Updated
Jul 31, 2024
Editor
Jim Banke
Contact

Related Terms

View the full article

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.
Note: Your post will require moderator approval before it will be visible.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

  • Similar Topics

    • By NASA
      1 min read
      Preparations for Next Moonwalk Simulations Underway (and Underwater)
      The Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) enables safe, sustainable, and efficient aviation transportation operations to benefit the flying public and ensure the global competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry. We are transforming the future of aviation into a digital, federated, and service-oriented architecture that fosters the growth of safe airspace for all users.
      By partnering with FAA, academia, safety experts, operators, manufacturers, municipalities, and other government agencies, we facilitate the integration of new aviation technologies, ensure airspace access for new entrants, and champion the success of increasingly autonomous operations. At AOSP, safety is at the heart of everything we do. We stand firm in our unwavering commitment to the safe integration of these vehicles.
       AOSP Approach:
      Efficient, Sustainable Aviation Operations Seamless Integration of Heterogeneous and Emergent Aviation Prognostic In-Time Aviation Safety Management System of Future Operations System Level Autonomy for Aviation Operations, Vehicle Command and Control Systems, and Safety Meet the diversity, density, and complexity challenges of future aviation AOSP Projects
      Advanced Capabilities for Emergency Response Operations Project
      Air Mobility Pathfinders
      Air Traffic Management—Exploration (ATM-X)
      System-Wide Safety (SWS)
      Facebook logo @NASA@NASAaero@NASA_es @NASA@NASAaero@NASA_es Instagram logo @NASA@NASAaero@NASA_es Linkedin logo @NASA Explore More
      2 min read Media Invited to Speak to NASA Ames Experts – Celebrating 85 Years
      Article 2 hours ago 3 min read NASA Sees Progress on Starlab Commercial Space Station Development
      Article 24 hours ago 4 min read Helium Conservation by Diffusion Limited Purging of Liquid Hydrogen Tanks
      Article 5 days ago Keep Exploring Discover More Topics From NASA
      Missions
      Humans In Space
      Solar System Exploration
      Solar System Overview Our solar system has one star, eight planets, five officially named dwarf planets, hundreds of moons, thousands…
      Explore NASA’s History
      Share
      Details
      Last Updated Dec 17, 2024 EditorLillian GipsonContactJim Bankejim.banke@nasa.gov Related Terms
      General View the full article
    • By NASA
      This article is from the 2024 Technical Update.

      Multiple human spaceflight programs are underway at NASA including Orion, Space Launch System, Gateway, Human Landing System, and EVA and Lunar Surface Mobility programs. Achieving success in these programs requires NASA to collaborate with a variety of commercial partners, including both new spaceflight companies and robotic spaceflight companies pursuing crewed spaceflight for the first time. It is not always clear to these organizations how to show their systems are safe for human spaceflight. This is particularly true for avionics systems, which are responsible for performing some of a crewed spacecraft’s most critical functions. NASA recently published guidance describing how to show the design of an avionic system meets safety requirements for crewed missions.
      Background
      The avionics in a crewed spacecraft perform many safety critical functions, including controlling the position and attitude of the spacecraft, activating onboard abort systems, and firing pyrotechnics. The incorrect operation of any of these functions can be catastrophic, causing loss of the crew. NASA’s human rating requirements describe the need for “additional rigor and scrutiny” when designing safety-critical systems beyond that done
      for uncrewed spacecraft [2]. Unfortunately, it is not always clear how to interpret this guidance and show an avionics architecture is sufficiently safe. To address this problem, NASA recently published NASA/TM−20240009366 [1]. It outlines best practices for designing safety-critical avionics, as well as describes key artifacts or evidence NASA needs to assess the safety of an avionics architecture.
      Failure Hypothesis
      One of the most important steps to designing an avionics architecture for crewed spacecraft is specification of the failure hypothesis (FH). In short, the FH summarizes any assumptions the designers make about the type, number, and persistence of component failures (e.g., of onboard computers, network switches). It divides the space of all possible failures into two parts – failures the system is designed to tolerate and failures it is not.
      One key part of the FH is a description of failure modes the system can tolerate – i.e., the behavior exhibited by a failed component. Failure modes are categorized using a failure model. A typical failure model for avionics splits failures into two broad categories:
      Value failures, where data produced by a component is missing (i.e., an omissive failure) or incorrect (i.e., a transmissive failure). Timing failures, where data is produced by a component at the wrong time.
      Timing failures can be further divided into many sub-categories, including:
      Inadvertent activation, where data is produced by a component without the necessary preconditions. Out-of-order failures, where data is produced by a component in an incorrect sequence. Marginal timing failures, where data is produced by a component slightly too early or late.
      In addition to occurring when data is produced by a component, these failure modes can also occur when data enters a component. (e.g., a faulty component can corrupt a message it receives). Moreover, all failure modes can manifest in one of two ways:
      Symmetrically, where all observers see the same faulty behavior. Asymmetrically, where some observers see different faulty behavior.
      Importantly, NASA’s human-rating process requires that each of these failure modes be mitigated if it can result in catastrophic effects [2]. Any exceptions must be explicitly documented and strongly justified. In addition to specifying the failure modes a system can tolerate, the FH must specify any limiting assumptions about the relative arrival times of permanent failures and radiation-induced upsets/ errors or the ability for ground operator to intervene to safe the system or take recovery actions. For more information on specifying a FH and other artifacts needed to evaluate the safety of an avionics architecture for human spaceflight, see the full report [1].
      View the full article
    • By NASA
      The Fresh Eyes on Ice team receives the C. Peter Magrath exemplary project award from the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities. H. Buurman Congratulations to the Fresh Eyes on Ice project, which received a C. Peter Magrath exemplary project award from the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities! The award recognizes programs that demonstrate how colleges and universities have redesigned their learning, discovery, and engagement missions to deepen their partnerships and achieve broader impacts in their communities.
      “Thank you to all of you for making this project what it is.” said Fresh Eyes on Ice project lead Research Professor Katie Spellman from the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. “We couldn’t do it without you.”
      Fresh Eyes on Ice tracks changes in the timing and thickness of ice throughout Alaska and the circumpolar north. You can get involved by downloading the GLOBE Observer app and taking photos of ice conditions using the GLOBE Land Cover protocol.
      Fresh Eyes on Ice is supported by the Navigating the New Arctic Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation and the NASA Citizen Science for Earth Systems Program.
      Facebook logo @DoNASAScience @DoNASAScience Share








      Details
      Last Updated Dec 05, 2024 Related Terms
      Citizen Science Earth Science Explore More
      4 min read 2024 AGU Fall Meeting Hyperwall Schedule


      Article


      1 day ago
      2 min read This Thanksgiving, We’re Grateful for NASA’s Volunteer Scientists!


      Article


      1 week ago
      9 min read The Earth Observer Editor’s Corner: Fall 2024


      Article


      3 weeks ago
      View the full article
    • By NASA
      NASA has awarded Bastion Technologies Inc., of Houston, the Center Occupational Safety, Health, Medical, System Safety and Mission Assurance Contract (COSMC) at the agency’s Ames Research Center in California’s Silicon Valley.
      The COSMC contract is a hybrid cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract, with an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity component and maximum potential value of $53 million. The contract phase-in begins Thursday, Jan. 2, 2025, followed by a one-year base period that begins Feb. 14, 2025, and options to extend performance through Aug. 13, 2030.
      Under this contract, the company will provide support for occupational safety, industrial hygiene, health physics, safety and health training, emergency response, safety culture, medical, wellness, fitness, and employee assistance. The contractor also will provide subject matter expertise in several areas including system safety, software safety and assurance, quality assurance, pressure system safety, procurement quality assurance, and range safety. Work will primarily be performed at NASA Ames and NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center in Edwards, California, as needed.
      For information about NASA and agency programs, visit:
      https://www.nasa.gov
      -end-
      Tiernan Doyle
      NASA Headquarters, Washington
      202-358-1600
      tiernan.p.doyle@nasa.gov
      Rachel Hoover
      Ames Research Center, Silicon Valley, Calif.
      650-604-4789
      rachel.hoover@nasa.gov
      View the full article
    • By European Space Agency
      Video: 00:02:18 At ESA, through the Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems programme, we’re addressing solutions for when safety and security of communication services cannot be guaranteed by the terrestrial networks alone. With our programme Space systems for Safety and Security, or 4S, we are pioneering cutting-edge development of secure and resilient satellite communication systems, technologies and services to improve life on Earth. 
      Picture a world where our critical infrastructure is protected from cyber threats, and where communication links work when the world around them doesn't. A transportation network where safety is not just a priority, but a guarantee. Where air traffic flows completely efficiently, reliable and connected. Railways operate without interruption, and shipping can navigate safely and securely.
      Imagine that our first responders are coordinating via seamless communications, and institutional agencies are acting rapidly and decisively when there's a crisis. All thanks to secure and safe satellite communication systems, orbiting above the planet. This is the future we're building with the 4S programme. A future where space systems safeguard our security, making sure that connectivity remains our greatest strength. Join us as we continue to push the boundaries of innovation.
       
      View the full article
  • Check out these Videos

×
×
  • Create New...